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Abstract  
This study examines the extent of direct tax avoidance through income-shifting 
between wages and dividends, and approximates the deadweight loss due to this 
behavior for the owners of privately held corporations. The dual income tax 
system in Finland offers noticeable incentives for income-shifting. The extensive 
dividend tax reform of 2005 enables us to study how this particular form of tax 
avoidance reacts to an exogenous change in tax rates. Our results support highly 
active income-shifting, and the apparent tax avoidance behavior has considerable 
welfare effects. We also find evidence that costs related to income-shifting 
behavior affect the effectiveness of taxation. 
Key words: Tax avoidance, income shifting, entrepreneurs, dual income tax 
JEL classification numbers: H21, H25, H32 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan yrittäjien tulonmuunnon aktiivisuutta. 
Suomessa voimassa oleva eriytetty tuloverojärjestelmä kannustaa tulojen 
siirtämiseen ansiotulojen ja pääomatulojen välillä. Tämä tulonmuuntokannustin 
on erityisen merkittävä listaamattomien osakeyhtiöiden omistajille, jotka voivat 
nostaa tuloa yrityksestään sekä palkkana että osinkona. Tutkimuksessa 
hyödynnetään vuoden 2005 osinkoverouudistusta, joka keskimäärin lisäsi 
omistajien kannustimia maksaa enemmän palkkaa suhteessa osinkoihin. 
Tulonmuuntoa mitataan tarkastelemalla miten verotuksellisesti optimaalisen 
palkan osuuden muutos vaikuttaa yrittäjän nostaman palkan määrään. 
Tulosten perusteella verouudistus vaikutti selvästi tulokombinaation valintaan. 
Yhden euron muutos vero-optimaalisessa palkassa johtaa keskimäärin 66 sentin 
muutokseen havaitussa palkassa. Tulonmuuntoaktiivisuus on suhteellisen 
samanlaista eri omistajaryhmissä ja erilaisissa yhtiöissä. Lisäksi kustannukset ja 
hyödyt tulojen muuntamisesta vaikuttavat havaittuun käyttäytymiseen.  
  
 
Tulonmuunto on tärkeä ottaa huomioon, kun verojärjestelmää suunnitellaan ja 
verotuottoja arvioidaan. Tulonmuunto vaikuttaa verotuloihin ja heikentää 
verojärjestelmän taloudellista tehokkuutta. Tulosten perusteella tulonmuuntoa ja 
sen haitallisia vaikutuksia voidaan vähentää kahdella tavalla: kaventamalla 
palkka- ja osinkotuloverojen välistä eroa sekä vaikuttamalla lainsäädännöllisesti 
osinko- ja palkkatulojen määräytymisperusteisiin. 
Asiasanat: Tulonmuunto, yrittäjät, eriytetty tuloverotus 
JEL-luokittelu: H21, H25, H32 
 
 
1 Introduction
It is well known in public finance literature that behavioral responses to income taxation
decrease the efficiency of a tax system. One source of inefficiency is tax avoidance
activity. Income-shifting between differently taxed tax bases is a common example of
a tax avoidance channel. This behavior directly decreases tax revenue and increases
the deadweight loss of income taxation. Income shifting is generally recognized in the
literature, but only a few studies have offered credible empirical estimates of its size.
Our aim is to provide new evidence on the extent and significance of income-shifting
behavior, and study how the design of the tax code affects it.
Income-shifting is especially relevant for entrepreneurs and the owners of privately
held businesses. Compared to wage earners, entrepreneurs and business owners have a
wider scope of legal possibilities to engage in income-shifting, as they can more easily
apply different types of income as a source of personal compensation1. Income-shifting
possibilities and tax incentives are especially pronounced within a so-called dual income
tax system (DIT). In a typical DIT, the marginal tax rate schedules for labor income
and capital income differ significantly from one another.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we carefully quan-
tify the extent and significance of income-shifting between different tax bases among
the owners of privately held corporations in Finland2. We then use these results to
approximate the deadweight loss due to this form of tax avoidance behavior. In addi-
tion, we analyze the heterogeneity of tax avoidance among different types of firms and
owners. We also study how the costs and benefits of tax avoidance affect the rate of the
income-shifting response. The potential effects of these factors offer evidence for both
researchers and policy makers that the inefficiency caused by income-shifting might be
mitigated by simply re-designing and adjusting the tax code and regulations.
We exploit the extensive corporate and dividend tax reform of 2005 in Finland as an
exogenous source of tax rate variation. The reform increased the marginal tax rate on
dividends, thus increasing the incentives to pay wages instead of dividends as a form of
personal compensation. Furthermore, the reform changed the tax incentives differently
for approximately similar owners. Also, the reform created variation in the potential
1In addition to many tax bases, income-shifting can also occur in other forms. A well-known example
is intertemporal income-shifting, where the behavioral response comes in the form of anticipating the
forthcoming tax rate change or in some other change in behavior over time (see for example Goolsbee
(2000)). This paper focuses on the (static) longer run effect of income-shifting between tax bases.
2Privately held corporations are defined as corporations that are not listed on a public stock exchange
(cf. public or listed corporations). In the Finnish tax system, dividends from listed and privately owned
corporations are taxed at different tax rates and tax regulations.
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monetary benefits stemming from income-shifting. These features combined with the
total tax record data and the unique opportunity to link tax record information from
the owner level to the firm level create an interesting starting point to analyze income-
shifting. The extensive data enable us to precisely define the tax-optimal composition
of total gross income for each owner of a privately held corporation before and after the
reform.
We find clear support for the view that the owners of privately held corporations
are active in income-shifting. Increased dividend taxation following the 2005 tax reform
led the owners to adjust their composition of income by significantly increasing wage
compensation at the expense of dividends. Using standard approaches in the excess
burden literature, we assess this income-shifting response to be substantial. In addition,
we do not observe much heterogeneity in the income-shifting response between different
entrepreneurs or firms. However, the size of the tax incentive change and the monetary
gains from tax optimization affect the income-shifting response.
Earlier empirical studies concerning tax avoidance behavior among entrepreneurs
and corporate owners have been rather rare. Gordon and Slemrod (2000) offer an
overview of the income-shifting literature and show evidence of tax-motivated income-
shifting between personal and corporate tax bases among corporate owners in the US.
Gordon and Slemrod conclude that distinctive income-shifting effects need to be taken
into account in the efficiency analysis of the tax system. Also, Sivadasan and Slemrod
(2008) find that a decrease in the effective tax rate on wages led to a significant increase
in managerial wage compensation for partners of partnership firms in India.
Income-shifting responses are closely related to the analysis of the elasticity of taxable
income (ETI). The ETI captures tax avoidance behavior, along with all other forms
of behavioral responses to income taxation (see Feldstein (1999)). The ETI is usually
estimated to be much larger among entrepreneurs than wage earners (Auten and Carroll
(1999)). Top-income earners, who are often entrepreneurs and business owners, seem to
respond to tax changes more actively than others (Gruber and Saez (2002)).
Also, Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011) show that entrepreneurs bunch at the kink
points of the tax schedule much more than laborers. This suggests that individuals with
self-employment income have more opportunities to react to the piecewise structure of
the income tax code and are more aware of the details of the tax schedule. In addition,
concentrated ownership structure is shown to increase tax planning among business
owners in the US (Chetty and Saez (2010)).
Earlier Finnish studies provide some evidence of tax avoidance. Pirttilä and Selin
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(2011) show that the relative share of capital income increased among entrepreneurs after
the implementation of the Finnish DIT system in 1993. Kari et al. (2008 and 2009) use
the Finnish tax reform of 2005 as an exogenous shock for privately held corporations.
They report clear-cut results of how higher dividend taxation after the reform increased
dividend payments before the reform (anticipation effect), and decreased it afterward.
Within other Nordic Countries, Fjaerli and Lund (2001) find support for the hypothesis
of active income-shifting among entrepreneurs in Norway. In Denmark, le Maire and
Schjerning (2012) provide evidence of income smoothing and intertemporal income-
shifting among the self-employed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the institutional
background of the Finnish DIT schedule and describes the main attributes of the 2005
tax reform. Section 3 depicts the theoretical background for our empirical analysis.
Section 4 presents the empirical model and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the
results. Section 6 presents extensions to our baseline model, including an analysis of the
costs and benefits in income-shifting behavior. Section 7 concludes.
2 Finnish dual income tax system and the tax reform
of 2005
Since 1993 Finland has applied the principle of Nordic-type dual income taxation (DIT).
In DIT, earned income (wages, pensions, fringe benefits etc.) is taxed at a progressive tax
rate schedule, whereas personal capital income (interest income, capital gains, dividends
from listed corporations etc.) is taxed at a flat tax rate. A distinctive feature of the
DIT system is that the flat tax rate on capital income is set much lower than the highest
marginal tax rates on earned income. The low flat tax rate for all capital income was
motivated for various reasons, for example broadening the tax base, decreasing the scope
for tax arbitrage, and increased global capital mobility which all argue in favor of taxing
capital income more leniently.3
3A more general discussion and the theoretical reasons for applying Nordic type DIT can be found
for example in Nielsen and Sørensen (1997) and Sørensen (2005).
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The Finnish dual income tax system until 2005
Until 2005, Finnish DIT applied a full imputation system of corporate taxes to remove
the double taxation of dividends. In general, the taxation of wages, dividends and
capital gains from privately held corporations was organized according to the following
rules and principles:
• Firm profits were taxed at a flat corporate income tax rate (29%), which equaled
the personal capital income tax rate.
• Dividends:
– Dividends up to the amount corresponding to the imputed normal return on
the net assets of the firm (assets−liabilities) were regarded as capital income
dividends, taxed at the flat capital income tax rate of 29%.
– Dividends exceeding the imputed normal rate of return were categorized as
progressively taxed earned income dividends4.
– Corporate taxes were fully credited against the dividend tax liability of a
shareholder, resulting in single taxation of dividends.
• Capital gains were taxed as personal capital income.
• Wages were taxed as earned income, subject to a progressive tax rate schedule
(0-56%, depending on taxable income). Wages were single-taxed as they were de-
ductible from firm profits. Wages and progressively taxed earned income dividends
were not taxed with fully similar tax rules.
The main attributes of the 2005 dividend tax reform
From 2005 onward, the full imputation system was abolished, and Finland switched to a
partial double taxation of dividend income where 70% of dividends were included in the
shareholder’s taxable income5. Therefore, after the reform, all dividends were subject
to the corporate tax rate, and 70% of dividend income became double-taxed. However,
capital income dividends up to 90,000 € were made tax-exempt in individual taxation,
resulting in effective single taxation of these dividends. Also, the corporate tax rate
4The effective imputed normal rate of return on net assets is 9%. For example, with assets of 500,000
euros, liabilities of 100,000 euros and the rate of return set to 9%, the maximum amount of dividends
taxed at the flat tax rate is 36,000 euros. In other words, in 2004, any dividends received from the
firm below 36,000 euros were effectively taxed at the flat tax rate of 29%, and any dividends above this
amount were subject to progressive earned income taxation with marginal tax rates between 0-56%.
5The content of the 2005 tax reform was made public already in 2003. For evidence of anticipation
effects, see Kari et al. (2008).
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was cut to 26% from the previous 29% and the capital income tax rate was lowered by
one percentage point to 28%. The splitting rule of dividend income into capital income
dividends and earned income dividends was maintained.
The effective taxation of capital income dividends below 90,000 € did not change
significantly in the reform, as the imputed normal return on net assets was single-taxed.
Consequently, the main outcome of the reform was the higher taxation of earned income
dividends as they were no longer single-taxed. At the same time, there were no significant
changes in the taxation of wages.6
Another very important aspect of the reform was its primary motive. According to
the European Union Court of Justice, the pre-reform Finnish system of full corporate tax
imputation was not in accordance with European Union legislation. Full imputation was
given only to domestic shareholders. Also, the imputed credit was not given to Finnish
shareholders whose firms operate abroad. These violated EU regulations on equal tax
treatment of all EU citizens. Therefore Finnish legislators were more or less forced
to change the tax system towards a more unified tax treatment. This procedure has
important implications for our study. As the reform was not driven by the economic
and fiscal conditions in Finland, the tax reform of 2005 was exogenous from the point
of view of domestic shareholders.
Tax incentives for income-shifting
Within the DIT system, the wide gap between the marginal tax rates on capital income
and earned income creates a tricky task for the legislator: How to formalize the taxation
of business owners in such a manner that it prevents income-shifting from heavily taxed
earned income to more leniently taxed personal capital income? At the same time, the
lawmaker needs to assure that the return on invested capital is not overtaxed.
Even though the Finnish DIT system prevents direct income-shifting through profit
distributions, there are still ample possibilities for tax avoidance. Owners of privately
held corporations may seek to minimize taxes by dynamically optimizing the level of
net assets, and in a static year-to-year context, by choosing an optimal combination of
wages and dividends as their personal compensation from the firm7. In this paper we
focus on the latter case.
The reform of 2005 significantly changed the income-shifting incentives for the owners
of privately held corporations. Figure 1 describes the changes in the overall tax incentives
6A broader description of the Finnish tax system and the 2005 tax reform can be found in Appendix
A.
7There are only a few minor legal limitations on the form in which the main owner can withdraw
income from the firm. For more details, see Appendix A.
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due to the tax reform. This Figure presents the marginal tax rates (MTR) on wages and
dividends before (2002) and after (2007) the reform with both zero firm-level net assets
and with net assets of 170,000 € (median net assets in the data). Thus the Figure also
describes the effect of net assets on the MTR of dividends. As described before, the
net assets position of the firm defines the amount of dividends taxed at the flat capital
income tax rate.
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Note: MTR on wages is calculated with dividend income equal to zero and vice versa.
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Figure 1: Marginal tax rates (MTR) on wages and dividends: Years 2002 (left) and 2007
(right). Above no net assets, below net assets of 170,000 €
When comparing 2002 and 2007, we can see that the MTR on dividends increased
after the reform, while there were only modest changes in the tax schedule for wages.
Also, an increase in the level of net assets has a notable effect on the MTR on dividends,
as larger net assets decrease the MTR. Thus Figure 1 shows that owners with the same
total income but different firm net assets experienced very different changes in their tax
incentives following the reform of 2005.
To recap, Table 1 below highlights the main characteristics of the pre and post reform
tax systems and the changes in income-shifting incentives.
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Before After
Tax law
All dividends are single-taxed. Capital income dividends below 90,000 €
are single-taxed. All other dividends are
partially double-taxed.
Tax incentives
Capital income dividends are tax-preferred
over wages if the MTR on wages is higher
than the capital income tax rate of 29%.
Capital income dividends below 90,000 €
are tax-preferred over wages when the
MTR on wages exceeds the corporate
income tax rate of 26%.
Small wage income (< 7,500 €) is
tax-preferred over earned income dividends.
Wages are tax-preferred over earned income
dividends up to 60,000 €.
Table 1: Main characteristics and implications of the tax reform of 2005 for the owners
of privately held corporations
3 Theoretical framework
3.1 Tax optimization model
The following theoretical model is intended to clarify our empirical strategy to measure
the level and significance of tax avoidance via income-shifting. In the model, the owner of
a privately held corporation both owns a significant part of the corporation and works
for the firm. We assume that the owner makes all the relevant decisions about the
distribution of profits. Profits are paid out to the owner as a combination of wages and
dividends. Importantly, wages and dividends are taxed at different tax rate schedules.
The aim of static tax optimization is to choose a combination of wages and dividends
such that the total taxes paid are as low as possible. The owner receives positive utility
from his/her net-of-tax income (i.e. net wages and net dividends). The utility function
is of the form U(W + D), where W is net wages and D is net dividends. The payout
budget constraint is Π−R = W g +Dg, where Π is the total distributable profits from
the firm before taxes, R is retained earnings and W g and Dg are gross wage income
and gross dividend income from the firm. As in Fjaerli and Lund (2001), we focus
exclusively on the choice of the optimal combination of wages and dividends conditional
on given total profits Π and retained earnings R. In other words, we do not model the
income-generating process of the firm nor the optimal level of retained and/or distributed
profits, and thus simply assume Π and R to be exogenous8. We follow this assumption
8The choice of retained earnings (R) is relevant in dynamic tax optimization. R increase net assets,
which are the base for calculating the share of dividends taxed as capital income in the Finnish DIT
system. Other than purely tax-motivated issues also define the amount of R (for example, essential
investments and imperfect capital markets). In the analysis, we assume that R is already optimized, or
simply taken as given. However, the endogenous nature of R does not change the relevance of the static
7
throughout the paper.
More formally, the owner’s optimization problem is to
maxU(W +D) = [1− tW (W g, Dg, I)]W g + [1− tD(W g, Dg, I)]Dg (1)
subject to
Π−R = W g +Dg (2)
where tW (W g, Dg, I) and tD(W g, Dg, I) are the average tax rates on wages and divi-
dends, respectively. The tax rate on wage income tW (W g, Dg, I) consists of personal
income taxes plus firm-level social security contributions. The tax rate on dividends
tD(W
g, Dg, I) includes dividend taxes plus corporate taxes associated with withdrawn
dividends9. Also, both tax rates depend on income earned outside the firm, denoted by
I. This income includes, for example, wages from a secondary job and dividends from
other non-listed firms. I is assumed to be exogenous in the model.
Both tax rates are always between zero and one. The wage tax rate tW (W g, Dg, I) is
also a function of dividends, and dividend taxes tD(W g, Dg, I) are a function of wages.
This implies that the amount of wages withdrawn from the firm is allowed to have
an effect on the tax rate on dividends, and vice versa. Also, we assume that the tax
rate schedules on wages and dividends are “well-behaved”, smooth and monotonically
increasing functions of W g and Dg. For now, we assume there are no optimization
frictions or optimization errors.
After taking the first order conditions with respect to W g and Dg and rearranging
the terms, we get the owners’ optimality condition
tW (W
g, Dg, I) +
(
∂tW (W
g,Dg,I)
∂W g − ∂tW (W
g,Dg,I)
∂Dg
)
W g
tD(W g, Dg, I) +
(
∂tD(W g,Dg,I)
∂Dg − ∂tD(W
g,Dg,I)
∂W g
)
Dg
=
MTRW
MTRD
= 1 (3)
which says that the combination of gross wages and gross dividends is optimal when the
marginal tax rates (MTR) are equal. The intuition is that if MTRW > MTRD, the
optimal behavior would be to replace W g with Dg up to the point at which the tax rate
differential is zero.
The optimality condition (3) determines the optimal combination of gross wages and
gross dividends, denoted by (W ∗, D∗). This gross income combination minimizes taxes,
year-to-year tax minimization problem of choosing the tax-optimal combination of wages and dividends.
Also, without year-to-year tax optimization, the benefits from dynamic tax avoidance diminish or vanish
altogether.
9Wages are assumed to be deductible from firm profits whereas dividends are not.
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and therefore maximizes the total net income withdrawn from the firm.
However, assumptions behind the theoretical optimality condition do not generally
hold in practice. For example, real-life tax rate schedules are not smooth and continuous.
If anything, the schedules are more or less discontinuous piecewise linear functions of
income. In addition, optimization frictions might matter, and optimization errors might
occur for at least some owners. All of these issues imply a deviation from the optimality
condition (3)10. Nevertheless, equation (3) illustrates the main determinant of income-
shifting behavior: the ratio of the associated tax rates of differently taxed tax bases
MTRW /MTRD. In other words, the tax optimal gross income combination (W ∗, D∗)
remains the key parameter to consider even if some of the theoretical assumptions are
relaxed11.
3.2 The deadweight loss of income-shifting
After characterizing the individual owner’s tax optimization pattern, we next derive
a formula for the marginal deadweight loss of income-shifting behavior. Our setup is
similar to the model of marginal excess burden with resource costs from tax avoidance
by Chetty (2009a), and the taxable income model by Feldstein (1999).
In our version of the model, the owner’s problem is to
maxU(W +D, γ) = (1− tW )(W˜ g − γ) + (1− tD)(D˜g + γ)− φ(γ) (4)
subject to
Π−R = (W˜ g − γ) + (D˜g + γ) (5)
where (W˜ g − γ) = W g, (D˜g + γ) = Dg. W˜ g and D˜g are wage income and dividend
income when there is no income-shifting. γ is the amount of income shifted from wages
to dividends at the margin, and φ(γ) denotes the real private cost of income-shifting,
10As shown in Chetty (2012) and Chetty et al. (2011), search costs and other optimization frictions
might matter in tax-optimization behavior. Optimization costs will be analyzed later in Section 6.
There are also some other matters that might implicate a deviation from the non-frictional solution
(3). Fjaerli and Lund (2001) suggest that benefits received from paying social security contributions
increase wages as a form of compensation, although no compelling evidence has been found to support
this view. Also, wages can be seen as a socially more acceptable form of personal compensation. These
matters imply that we would observe higher realized wages than what equation (3) suggests.
11Sivadasan and Slemrod (2008) derive similar theoretical predictions in their model for partners of
partnership firms in India. Also, Fjaerli and Lund (2001) get the same result when pension considera-
tions related to wage payments are not included in their model. Christiansen and Tuomala (2008) and
Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva (2011) discuss the implications of income-shifting between tax bases in
the optimal income taxation framework.
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i.e. the cost of changing the tax base12.
In this framework, we assume that the marginal tax rates tW and tD are constant,
i.e. we are on the linear segments of the tax rate schedules. For convenience, we assume
for now that tW > tD. Also, there are no optimization errors and no other private
transfer costs involved in income-shifting behavior13.
We use the standard approach in the deadweight loss literature and compare the
marginal excess burden caused by behavioral responses to a tax rate change to a bench-
mark case without any behavioral responses, or assuming that the tax revenue collected
by the government is returned to the owner as a lump sum transfer (see for example
Chetty (2009a) and (2009b)). The social welfare function $(tW , tD) is expressed as the
sum of the owner’s utility (in the curly brackets) and the tax revenue collected by the
government
$(tW , tD) =
{
(1− tW )(W˜ g − γ)− (1− tD)(D˜g + γ)− φ(γ)
}
+tW (W˜
g − γ) + tD(D˜g + γ) (6)
Next, consider a marginal change in the wage tax rate, dtW . As the owner has op-
timized γ (resulting in a tax optimal combination of gross wages and gross dividends,
(W ∗, D∗)), we may ignore the behavioral responses in the curly brackets (i.e. the enve-
lope condition states that dtW has only a first-order effect on the owner’s utility). After
arranging the terms, the marginal excess burden can be written as14
d$(tW , tD)
dtW
=
dγ
dtW
(tD − tW ) (7)
We assume that there are no changes in W˜ g and D˜g, i.e. W˜ g and D˜g are exogenous.
In other words, we concentrate only on the marginal excess burden caused by the income-
shifting effect with given total gross income, which is denoted on the right hand side of
equation (7).
Equation (7) implies that the marginal deadweight loss of income-shifting comprises
of two components: The first is the response of the amount of income shifted, and the
12The outcome of the marginal excess burden model remains the same whether we set the cost to
be fixed or an increasing function of the amount of income shifted. However, the definition of the
cost parameter has implications when interpreting the tax-optimization model of the owner. Section 6
discusses this in the presence of fixed costs of income-shifting.
13Chetty (2009a) analyzes the deadweight loss and tax avoidance under optimization errors and
transfer costs. In short, these issues add further dimensions to the analysis if the marginal social cost
of avoidance behavior does not equal the net-of-tax rate. In this simplified case we abstract from this
possibility. However, we briefly discuss this issue in the end of Section 5.
14The first-order effects on the owner’s utility and the tax revenue of the government cancel each
other out by definition.
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second is the difference in dividend and wage income tax rates15. Intuitively, the result
suggests that the marginal excess burden of income-shifting is larger the bigger the
difference is between the tax rates, and the behavioral income-shifting response defines
the scope of the deadweight loss. In general, both tax rates tW and tD are known. To
be able to approximate the scope of the inefficiency, we need a credible estimate of the
average behavioral response.
As shown before in Section 3.1, with fixed total income, the amount of income shifted
depends on the relative share of the tax rates (i.e. the change in wage income directly
affects dividend income and the tax rate on dividends, and vice versa). Therefore, the
goal of our empirical analysis is to derive an estimate for dγ/d(tW/tD) in order to assess
the marginal excess burden.
3.3 Testable hypotheses
Based on the theory presented above, we take up the following questions in our empirical
analysis:
• Does the tax code determine the choice of income type, and if so, to what extent?
• Are income-shifting responses heterogeneous among different firms and owners?
• How large is the marginal excess burden of income-shifting?
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
Our data set comes from the Finnish Tax Administration and it includes information on
the financial statements and tax records of Finnish businesses and business owners for
the years 2002, 2003, 2007 and 200816. We use it both in a cross-sectional and balanced
panel form. The unique characteristic of the data is that they contain basically all
15Saez (2004) derives a similar formula for the marginal excess burden when agents can shift income
between the personal tax base and the corporate tax base. However, Saez’s model also includes changes
in real behavior (total income, labor supply etc.).
16As mentioned before, the content of the 2005 tax reform was made public already in late 2003.
Kari et. al (2008) show evidence that privately held corporations anticipated the reform by increasing
dividend payments right before the reform, and decreasing them right afterward. Therefore, we do not
use the years closest to the reform in our baseline analysis in order to alleviate the effects caused by
anticipation on the longer-run income-shifting response between tax bases.
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Finnish businesses (all public and private corporations, partnerships, sole proprietors
etc.).
In this study we focus exclusively on the owners of privately held corporations. The
data contain all important tax information for the income-shifting analysis, for example
taxable wages and dividends paid to the owner by the firm, and income earned from
other sources by the owner. By linking the firm-level and the owner-level data together
we can analyze the effects of tax changes on owners’ income-shifting behavior while
consistently controlling for various firm and individual-level effects.
The owner-level data include only those individuals who received positive dividends
from the firm during a tax year. Furthermore, we concentrate only on those owners
who work in their own firm in an executive position and own at least 50% of the firm
alone or together with immediate family members (so called YEL-insured entrepreneurs
in Finnish tax legislation17).
4.2 Empirical model
This section describes the empirical model we exploit in our analysis. Our aim is to
study how the tax-optimal income composition affects the decision to withdraw different
types of income from the firm. This relationship can be described with the following
cross sectional equation
W gi,t = β ∗W ∗i,t +Xi,t + Ci + αt + εi,t, (8)
where W gi,t is realized gross wages from the firm for each owner i in year t. Xi,t is a
matrix of firm and owner-level variables that affect the amount of gross wage income and
the income composition. Ci describes time-invariant variables that affect gross wages,
such as innate abilities of the owner and the workers within the firm18. αt is the time
trend, and εi,t is the error term. Finally, W ∗i,t is the tax-optimal gross wage, which is the
variable of main interest in our analysis19. The parameter β denotes the income-shifting
effect on the actual gross wage income withdrawn from the firm.
The tax-optimal gross wageW ∗i,t summarizes the effects that both the tax rate sched-
ules of wages and dividends have on the actual realized gross wage, given the exogenous
17For more details on YEL-insurance status, see Appendix A.
18In the data, the available controls for Xi,t and Ci at the owner level are gender, age, other capital
income and the ownership share of the firm. On the firm level, the controls are turnover, number of
employees, profits, total assets, and location and industry dummies.
19Fjaerli and Lund (2001) use a similar explanatory variable in their study.
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total income Πi,t − Ri,t = W gi,t + Dgi,t. As we have the data actually used to tax the
owners, we have all the information needed to unambiguously define the tax-minimizing
values W ∗i,t and D∗i,t for every owner each year.
The tax-optimal gross wage is calculated using tax register information on the owners‘
total gross income from the firm (gross wages + gross dividends), net assets of the firm,
gross earned income from other sources and the tax code and regulations for the year
in question. In order to define (W ∗i,t, D∗i,t), we formulate a function that gives the tax-
minimizing amount of wages and dividends for each possible total gross income level
with respect to every combination of net assets and other earned income, while also
taking other individual tax information into account. In the optimization function,
the number of feasible outcomes for the optimal gross income combination for each total
gross income level is limited due to the stepwise nature of the tax code (given all possible
combinations of net assets and other earned income). In order to limit the number of
different combinations of total gross income, net assets and other earned income, an
income interval of 100 € is used20.
The empirical approach of using the tax-optimal income component as a measure for
income-shifting is not solely linked to the Finnish tax institutions or the dual income tax
schedule. This approach generalizes to any case where there are two or more differently
taxed tax bases available to the taxpayer. This also applies to different types of income
which differ only with respect to tax deductions or allowances. In the Finnish context,
an example of these is wages and earned income dividends, which are nominally part of
the same earned income tax base, but are effectively taxed differently both before and
after the tax reform of 2005.
As is well known in the microeconometric literature, estimating the causal effect
of the tax code on the composition of realized income using equation (8) is difficult in
practice. Many of the time-invariant variables that might affect income-shifting behavior
are generally unobserved, which violates the exogeneity condition cov(W ∗i,t, εi,t) = 0.
Therefore, we use panel data and the tax reform of 2005 to estimate the model. Taking
first differences of equation (8) between t and t+ j gives us our estimable model
20The calculations are performed using Stata. The codes are available from the authors upon request.
Appendix B presents an illustrative example of the optimization process and the changes in tax optimal
gross wages due to the tax reform of 2005. Ropponen (2012) provides a thorough analysis and discussion
of optimal income components within the Finnish dual income tax system (in Finnish only).
13
W gi,t+j −W gi,t = (αt+j − αt) + η(W ∗i,t+j −W ∗i,t) + (9)
µ(Xi,t+j −Xi,t) + (εi,t+j − εi,t).
In this first-differences (FD) model, the time-invariant component Ci gets canceled
out by definition. In contrast to the cross sectional one-year analysis in Fjaerli and Lund
(2001), we focus on identifying the effect of the tax-optimal income component on the
composition of income using exogenous individual variation in W ∗ in time.
Our main interest is in the coefficient η, which expresses the effect of a change in
tax-optimal gross wages on the change in realized gross wages (conditional on given total
gross income in both years). The change in the tax-optimal gross wage W ∗i,t+j −W ∗i,t =
4W ∗i,t captures all the changes in the individual tax code. In addition to changes in
wage taxes, 4W ∗i,t also captures changes in dividend and corporate taxation.
The testable hypotheses in the FD model are the following: If changes in the tax code
explain the changes in the composition of income, η should be statistically significant
and greater than zero. A one-to-one income-shifting response implies that η = 1. Also,
adding control variables to the model should not affect the value of η, and the coefficients
for the controls should not be statistically significant if the change in the tax code is
truly the dominant factor behind the change in the division of income.
4.3 Identification
With regard to identifying the behavioral parameter η, an important feature is that the
tax reform of 2005 changed the income-shifting incentives differently for approximately
similar owners. In other words, 4W ∗i,t = W ∗i,t+j −W ∗i,t varies across otherwise similar
individuals in the data. Owners with similar total gross income (W gi,t + D
g
i,t), other
income, ownership share, and firm total assets, profits and turnover but with different
levels of firm net assets faced different changes in the marginal tax rates on dividends,
and thus get different values of 4W ∗i,t. For example, owners with relatively low total
income and a high level of net assets faced only modest changes in their marginal tax
rates, whereas owners with higher income and relatively low net assets were faced with
larger tax incentives to rearrange their total gross income. Also, different levels of other
earned income (i.e. earned income not received as wages or dividends from the firm)
create variation in tax optimal gross wages, as other earned income affects the marginal
tax rate on earned income withdrawn from the firm.
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Using 4W ∗i,t as a regressor instead of 4(MTRWi,t/MTRDi,t) helps to overcome the
issue of endogenous correlation between the income-shifting incentives and realized gross
wages. W ∗i,t is not mechanically correlated with realized gross wages or gross dividends
at a given level of total gross income, whereas marginal or average tax rates themselves
are. In most income tax systems, larger realized wages are associated with high marginal
tax rates and vice versa, causing these variables to be mechanically correlated in the FD
model. However, realized gross wages do not affect the value of the tax-optimal gross
wage, as W ∗i,t is the same for any combination of realized gross wages and realized gross
dividends at a given total gross income level (W gi,t + D
g
i,t). Therefore, in the presence
of exogenous tax rate variation, 4W ∗i,t is exogenous in the FD model and does not
necessarily require an instrumental variable.
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that changes in observed characteristics
such as net assets and other earned income might mechanically affect both 4W gi,t and
4W ∗i,t in some cases. For example, an increase in firm net assets, which on average lowers
the dividend tax rate and W ∗i,t, might induce a mechanical effect through a decrease in
realized wages as well (as there is, assuming other things unchanged, less total gross
income to be withdrawn altogether, e.g. due to an increase in retained earnings Ri,t).
Therefore, we also use an instrumental variable (IV) estimator to estimate the income-
shifting model. The IV estimation is presented and discussed in Section 6.
Finally, it is worth noting that W ∗i,t is not based on individual preferences; owners
with the exact same tax record information get the exact same values for tax-optimal
gross wages. Furthermore, we control for other individual and firm-level variation in a
rich way. In equation (9), the matrix (Xi,t+j−Xi,t) controls for changes in the ownership
share and other capital income on the owners’ side, and changes in turnover, number of
employees, profits and total assets on the firm side.
4.4 Descriptive statistics
Figure 2 presents the kernel density estimate distributions of wages and dividends re-
ceived by the owners of privately held corporations both before (2002) and after (2007)
the tax reform of 2005. From the Figure we can see that wage compensation increased
significantly after the tax reform. This was the main expected outcome in the light of
income-shifting incentives. Furthermore, Figure 2 does not indicate very notable changes
in the overall shape or location of the dividend distribution. However, there is a visible
dip in the density of small dividends, and an increase in the density of large dividends
15
at the 90,000 € tax schedule kink point. This was also expected, since after the reform
it became especially undesirable to distribute small amounts of dividends and dividends
above 90,000 €.
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Figure 2: The distributions of wage and dividend income of the owners of privately held
corporations in 2002 and 2007 (in current euros)
After defining the tax-optimal combination of gross wages and gross dividends, we
can compare the optimal gross wages to realized wages in order to describe the extent of
income-shifting behavior. In Figure 3, realized gross wages are divided by optimal gross
wages. The share is one if the owner has optimized his/her wage ‘perfectly’ with respect
to the tax code. Again, we use 2002 and 2007 as example years of pre- and post-reform
situations, respectively.
Figure 3 indicates clearly that owners optimize their level of wages actively. In
2007, over 40% of main owners optimized their wages perfectly. However, in 2002, we
observe less complete wage optimization, as slightly under 15% of owners optimized their
wages21. Peaks at the level of zero tell us that a fairly large proportion of all owners
were not paying wages at all in both of the years22.
21The monetary gains from income-shifting were smaller before 2005 (see Section 2 and Appendix
A for more details). This might explain the differences between post and pre-reform behavior in the
cross-sectional context. The significance of monetary gains from income-shifting is analyzed in Section
6.
22Figure 3 includes the optimal corner solutions as optimal choices. Dropping the optimal corner
solutions decreases the peak at the level of 1 especially before the tax reform. However, after the reform
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Figure 3: Realized gross wages divided by optimal gross wages in 2002 (left) and 2007
(right)
Figure 4 describes the relationship of the key variables in our study, the change in
realized gross wages 4W gi,t = W gi,t+j −W gi,t and the change in tax-optimal gross wages
4W ∗i,t = W ∗i,t+j − W ∗i,t between the years 2002 and 2007. There is a clear positive
relationship between the variables. Large 4W ∗i,t are followed by similar 4W gi,t. In other
words, changes in the realized division of gross income are closely related to the changes
in the tax code, measured by the changes in tax-optimal gross wages. We fit a non-
parametric Kernel estimate with a 95% confidence interval into the figure to further
illustrate this effect and its statistical significance. Furthermore, the Figure illustrates
that there is a considerable amount of variation in both realized and tax-optimal gross
wages in the data.
the overall picture of active income-shifting remains even when the optimal corner solutions are not
included.
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Figure 4: The effect of changes in tax-optimal gross wages 4W ∗i,t on the change in
realized gross wages 4W gi,t between 2002 and 2007 (in current euros)
Finally, Tables 6 and 7 in Appendix C present descriptive statistics for the key
variables in our analysis. All variables are presented in current euro prices. Table 6
presents the variables at the owner level. For example, the wages variable represents
total gross wages paid to the owner from his/her firm. Optimal gross wages and optimal
gross dividends are optimized according to the prevailing tax system in each year for
each observation.
There are significant differences in the pre- and post-reform optimal combinations
of gross wages and gross dividends. Before the 2005 tax reform, the average level of
tax-optimal gross wages was relatively low. After the increase in dividend taxation, the
average level of optimal wages relative to optimal dividends increased markedly.
Table 7 describes the characteristics at the firm level. These statistics are calculated
only for those firms for which we also have information at the owner level. The mean of
total assets, net assets and turnover all increased considerably over the time period of
2002-2008.
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5 Results
Tax optimization model
We estimate the first-differences equation (9) using a balanced panel data consisting
of the years 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008, and adding year dummies to the model. We
estimate the equation in levels, as many of both observed and optimal wages and op-
timal dividends are zero both before and after the reform. Therefore, for example, a
logarithmic model would lose too much information.
The results are presented in Table 2. The first column shows the effect of a change in
tax-optimal gross wages on a change in the realized gross income composition without
control variables, and the second column estimates are derived using the full set of
individual and firm-level controls23.
The owners of privately held corporations react to tax changes very actively. The tax
schedule has a remarkable and statistically significant effect on the decision to divide in-
come into wages and dividends (with a given level of total gross income). The coefficient
for the optimal gross wage implies that a one euro change in the tax optimal gross wage
affects realized gross wages by 66 cents (on average without controls). The estimate dif-
fers from one, so the income-shifting response is not “perfect”. However, the magnitude
of the optimal wage coefficient implies that the welfare costs of income-shifting might
be considerable.
Adding control variables does not change the results. The coefficient for optimal gross
wages with controls is very close to the coefficient without them, which supports the view
that the tax schedule is the main factor affecting the income composition. Furthermore,
adding controls does not affect the fit of the model. The R-squared statistic increases
only by 0.01 compared to the model with 4W ∗i,t as the only explanatory variable.
We also use a two-year difference model for the years 2002 and 2008 to estimate the
longer-run average effect. These results are presented in Appendix E. When using the
data for 2002 and 2008, the point estimate for income-shifting is approximately 0.68.
This estimate is not statistically different from that using the panel data for all four
years. This indicates that our results are robust and independent of the length of the
difference24.
23We also estimate the cross sectional model in equation (8) with a full set of control variables. The
cross section OLS estimates for the years 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008 are presented in Appendix D. The
results show that the point estimates for the coefficients of tax-optimal gross wages (W ∗) are between
0.90-1.05 and highly significant in every year. These results imply that income-shifting incentives and
realized behavior seem to be highly correlated. Fjaerli and Lund (2001) get qualitatively similar results
in their cross sectional analysis for Norway.
24The results are robust using all pairs of pre- and post-reform years. The results for the years 2002
and 2007 are presented in Table 4 in Section 6 (columns 3 and 4). Other results are available from the
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Also, the coefficients for the control variables are mostly insignificant or relatively
small, which again indicates that the changes in the tax system are the driving force
behind the decision on income composition. However, the ownership share seems to
have a negative effect on realized gross wages. When ownership is concentrated, the
owner has more power to make tax optimal decisions on income composition. In this
case, increased ownership seems to open up a way to pay out more low-taxed dividends
at the expense of wages (given the changes in the tax code). This result is also expected
in the light of previous literature. Chetty and Saez (2010) find that tax-optimization is
more active among corporate owners who own larger shares of the firm.
In addition, a change in the turnover of the firm has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the difference in realized gross wages, although the size of the effect
is very small. This can be interpreted as indicating that the growth of the firm (in
the sense of turnover) has a small increasing effect on wage compensations given the
change in the tax code. All the other coefficients for firm-level controls are statistically
insignificant, including the number of employees, profits and total assets. Therefore,
changes in most of the firm-side variables have no significant effect on the division of
income (on average).
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ΔWage ΔWage
ΔW ∗ 0.662*** 0.661***
(0.007) (0.013)
ΔOwnership -71.580**
(33.259)
ΔTurnover 0.000***
(0.000)
ΔTotal assets 0.000
(0.000)
ΔProfits -0.000
(0.000)
ΔEmployees 9.927
(9.469)
ΔOther capital income -0.001
(0.000)
Observations 17,238 17,238
R-squared 0.347 0.348
Note: Owner-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. First-differences
model estimated by OLS using balanced panel data for 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008: the dependent variable is
the difference in realized gross wages.
Table 2: First-differences model: OLS estimation
One important aspect is the heterogeneity of the income-shifting response. First, we
authors upon request.
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use quantile regression methods to study the heterogeneity around the average estimate.
In Figure 5, we plot the estimates at separate percentile points with the 95% confidence
intervals using equation (9) with the full set of controls. As can be seen from the Figure,
the point estimates are larger at higher percentiles. The largest estimate is close to one
at the 95th percentile point, which suggests that the income-shifting response is nearly
perfect among those owners who faced the largest absolute changes in their tax-optimal
wages. In contrast, the estimates are smaller for those whose tax incentives were not
affected as much by the tax reform. Thus it seems that income-shifting responses vary
in different percentiles compared to the average OLS estimate (dash line in Figure 5),
which is important to take into account when interpreting the results.
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Figure 5: First-differences model: Quantile regression results
We also categorize owners into four equally sized groups and estimate equation (9)
separately for these groups. We use base-year turnover, total assets and the number
of employees as continuous variables to study if there are differences in income-shifting
responses with respect to the size of the firm. We also estimate the model by age and
gender of the owner. In addition, we examine if there are differences in income-shifting
activity between industries. The results for the heterogeneity estimations are presented
in Appendix F.
In general, the income-shifting responses are quite homogeneous between different
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groups. There are no significant differences in tax avoidance activity between women and
men, age groups or the size of the firm. These results thus also suggest that the average
income-shifting response is not driven by certain types of owners or firms. However,
some differences can be detected at the industry level. For example, the owners of firms
in financing and agricultural industries shift income more actively than others.
The marginal deadweight loss of income-shifting
In order to link the marginal deadweight loss theory to our empirical income-shifting
estimate, we assume that dγ
d(
tW
tD
)
=
dW gi,t
dWi,t∗ . In other words, we replace the tax rate ratio
parameter d( tWtD ) with its empirical counterpart dW
∗
i,t. Furthermore, the income-shifting
component dγ equals the change in gross wages, dW gi,t. This follows from the definition
that total gross income is given, and thus any income shifted from or to gross wages
equals the change in the gross wage level.
Formally, the approximation for the marginal excess burden of tax avoidance via
income-shifting takes the following form
DWL ≈ dW
g
i,t
dW ∗i,t
(tD − tW )
where dW gi,t/dW
∗
i,t is the income-shifting response, and tD and tW are the marginal tax
rates on dividends and wages, respectively.
We approximate the DWL at the average point using the average values for realized
and optimal gross wages. Ideally, (tD − tW ) should reflect the difference between the
marginal tax rates when there are no possibilities for income-shifting. However, this
income composition is unobserved, as we only observe the realized income compositions
for each owner25. In order to evaluate the DWL, we need “counterfactual” values for the
marginal tax rates for the case where income-shifting does not exist. As the owners in
the data set all hold an executive position in their firm, the counterfactual wage income
and wage tax rate should correspond to the executive wage level of an employee with a
similar position in the firm. Counterfactual dividend income and the dividend tax rate
should correspond to the return on assets for a passive main owner not working for the
firm.
The firms in the data are relatively large and profitable. Thus we assume that a
non-owner executive position at these firms would require a relatively high wage com-
pensation. Also, the firms are wealthy in terms of net assets. Therefore we approximate
25I.e. in theory we would need to observe W˜ gi,t and D˜
g
i,t, but we only observe the income composition
when the income-shifting decision has already been made (see Section 3.2).
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the marginal tax rate difference by using the post-reform top bracket employee wage tax
rate (56%) and the dividend tax rate for capital income dividends (26%).
We estimate the average income-shifting response
dW gi,t
dWi,t∗ to be 0.66, which can be
considered large. Using this and the above mentioned assumptions on the tax rate
difference, we approximate the marginal DWL to be 0.2126. In addition, the marginal
excess burden is similar across different owners and firms, as the income-shifting response
itself does not vary significantly between different groups.
The approximated marginal DWL can be considered significant as it does not include
any real economy effects. A comparison to DWL estimates in the elasticity of taxable
income literature, calculated mostly in the US, reveals that this estimate is similar in
size (see Saez et al. (2012)). However, because of the absence of real economy responses,
our calculation does not necessarily capture all welfare losses if tax rate changes also
have a significant effect on the amount of total gross income (W g + Dg). In addition,
combining real effects and income-shifting responses could either decrease or increase
the DWL compared to the sole income-shifting inefficiency.
Furthermore, as emphasized by Chetty (2009a), the theoretical assumptions behind
the standard DWL model might not hold in practice. The marginal cost of income-
shifting might not equal the difference of the marginal wage and dividend tax rates,
which changes the interpretation of our excess burden model. In the extreme case where
income-shifting has no cost, the marginal excess burden equals zero, and income-shifting
only affects the allocation of resources between the public sector and the owner. If the
overall marginal social cost is positive but smaller than the tax rate difference, only a
part of the income-shifting response causes a deadweight loss27. Therefore, our estimate
of the excess burden of income-shifting serves mainly as an approximation of the scale
of the income-shifting response, and need to be interpreted with caution.
6 Extensions
IV estimation
As discussed in Section 4.3, it is possible that 4W ∗i,t is not completely exogenous in the
FD model. Thus we also use an IV estimator to estimate the model. In the IV estimator,
we define 4W ∗i,t with fixed characteristics and use it as an instrumental variable. This
26By using the second highest marginal tax rate for wages (48%), the DWL decreases to 0.15.
27In Section 6 we show that costs and benefits associated with income-shifting are significant in
income-shifting behavior.
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instrument, 4W ∗i,t, only accounts for the changes in tax-optimal gross wages caused
directly by the tax reform of 2005.
We use only the years 2002 and 2008 in the IV estimation. We calculate 4W ∗i,t using
total gross income, firm net assets and other earned income in the year in the middle of
the difference. We define the tax-optimal gross wages for total gross income, net assets
and other income in 2005 using both the 2002 and 2008 tax codes and regulations. The
difference of these tax optimal gross wages is then used as an instrument in the IV
estimator. These types of predicted tax instruments are widely used in the elasticity of
taxable income literature (see Saez et al. (2012) for a review). The basic idea of using
income and other characteristics in the middle year of the difference as a base for the
instrument has been proposed by Blomquist and Selin (2010). The use of income in the
middle year reduces the covariance between the instrument 4W ∗i,t and the error term
(εi,t+j − εi,t) if there are reasons to suspect that the instrument is a function of the
dependent variable (W gi,t+j −W gi,t). Therefore, for example, the use of characteristics at
time t as a base for the instrument might provide inconsistent estimates.
The two-stage least squares results are presented in Table 3. The instrumented coef-
ficient for the change in tax-optimal wages with the full set of controls is approximately
0.32 (column (4)), which is smaller than our baseline estimate. This shows that the
possibly endogenous part of the response causes an upward bias in the average income-
shifting estimate. Nevertheless, the IV estimate is still significant both statistically
and economically, which indicates that income-shifting is notable even when possible
mechanical effects on gross wages are taken into account.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 1st stage ∆W 1st stage ∆W
1st stage 0.523*** 0.528***
(0.014) (0.014)
∆W ∗ (instrumented) 0.344*** 0.319***
(0.034) (0.034)
Full set of controls No No Yes Yes
F-test 134.07 24.01
Observations 4,334 4,334 4,334 4,334
R-squared 0.252 0.259
Note: Owner-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01. Estimates from the instru-
mental variable model estimated with 2SLS for the years 2002 and 2008. Columns (1) and (3) represent the
first-stage results, and columns (2) and (4) report the coefficients for the instrumented optimal wage. The
dependent variables in (2) and (4) are changes in realized gross wages.
Table 3: First-differences model: IV estimation (2SLS)
As realized changes in net assets and other characteristics are not allowed to directly
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affect realized changes in the division of income, these estimates only denote the lower
bound for the total income-shifting response. For example, there is no general explicit
reason to assume that the change in net assets would be in itself (i.e. without the effect
on the tax rate on dividends) endogenous to the choice of income composition and the
type of income withdrawn from the firm. Therefore the IV approach probably excludes
part of the exogenous variation in income-shifting incentives as well.
When using the lower bound 2SLS estimate, the approximate for the average marginal
DWL of income-shifting decreases to 0.12. Thus even with the lower bound estimate,
the welfare costs of income-shifting are still non-negligible.
Optimization frictions
It has been shown both theoretically and empirically that optimization frictions, e.g.
adjustment and search costs, have an effect on individual tax-optimization behavior (see
Chetty (2012) and Chetty et al. (2011)). In short, the intuition behind the optimization
friction framework is that individuals are not responsive to changes in income taxation
if the potential utility benefit does not exceed the costs related to re-optimization (e.g.
adjusting the amount of labor supply). Also, the quantile regression estimates in Figure
5 show that larger changes in tax incentives increase the behavioral response of the
owners, which indicates that frictions might matter.
We define the utility gain from optimizing correctly with respect to the tax code as
4U = U(W ∗, D∗)− U(W 0, D0) (10)
where (W ∗, D∗) is the tax optimal combination of gross wages and gross dividends, and
(W 0, D0) is the gross income combination initially selected by the owner. In other words,
U(W ∗, D∗) = (1− tW )W ∗+(1− tD)D∗ denotes the utility from behaving optimally, i.e.
choosing the tax optimal gross income combination, and U(W 0, D0) = (1−tW )W 0+(1−
tD)D
0 denotes the utility stemming from an initial income combination. As (W ∗, D∗) is
a unique optimum that minimizes taxes and maximizes net payouts, and assuming the
utility function is linear in terms of total after-tax income, 4U is by definition always
non-negative.
The owner optimizes the combination of gross wages and gross dividends if the utility
gain from optimization exceeds a fixed individual optimization cost ψ. By applying this
threshold rule, the choice rule becomes
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(W g, Dg) =
(W
∗, D∗) if4U > ψ
(W 0, D0) otherwise
(11)
The cost of income-shifting can be interpreted as an opportunity cost of time or
simply as a monetary cost to tax consultants, or as any other individual fixed tax
compliance cost. To sum up, it is also rational for the owner not to withdraw the
tax-optimal combination of gross income (W ∗, D∗) from the firm if the costs are high
and/or the monetary benefits from tax optimization are low.
In the empirical analysis, we calculate the potential benefit 4U as the difference
between the taxes paid per total income at (W 0, D0) and taxes paid per total income
at the optimal point (W ∗, D∗) while keeping the total gross income level fixed. We
compare the relative amount of taxes paid after the reform of 2005 when there are no
behavioral changes in pre-reform income combination to taxes paid when the owner
has optimized her gross income combination perfectly. This variable thus describes
the monetary amount each owner would have gained by re-optimizing her gross income
combination after the reform.
The benefit analysis is carried out using a difference between only two years, namely
2002 (pre-reform) and 2007 (post-reform). To create the 4U variable, we take the 2002
actual realized gross income combination for each owner and tax it according to the
post-reform legislation of 2007. We then compare taxes paid under this setup to taxes
paid in the tax-optimal gross income combination under 2007 tax rules and the level of
2002 total gross income. Taxes paid are divided by total gross income in 2002 in order
to get a more realistic picture of the relative significance of the monetary benefit.
The above 4U variable is correlated with the realized wages paid in 2002, causing
4U to be endogenous in the model. Therefore, we need a valid instrumental variable
that is correlated with 4U but uncorrelated with the first-period realized wages (i.e.
2002 wages). A natural candidate for such an instrument is to derive a similar 4U
variable by using realized income in any of the pre-reform years. Thus we use a 4U
variable calculated with the realized total gross income in the year 2003 and the tax
code of 2007 as an instrumental variable for the potential benefits in our model.
More formally, the 1st stage of the two-stage least squares estimator is
4U2007i,2002 = χi + κ4U2007i,2003 + ρ(W ∗i,2007 −W ∗i,2002) + ϕ(Xi,2007 −Xi,2002) + νi (12)
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and the 2nd stage is
(W gi,2007-W
g
i,2002) = 4αi,t + η(W ∗i,2007 −W ∗i,2002)+
µ(Xi,2007 −Xi,2002) + θ∆Uˆ2007i,2002 +4i,t
(13)
where θ measures the average effect of monetary benefits on changing the gross income
combination. 4U2007i,2002 and 4U2007i,2003 denote the potential monetary benefits calculated
with 2002 and 2003 total gross income and the 2007 tax rules, respectively.
We expect those who benefit less from re-optimization not to change their behavior
after the reform, i.e. small relative benefits lead to small (or zero) changes in realized
gross wages, and vice versa. In this case θ is positive and significant. If the costs and
benefits are irrelevant in the income-shifting pattern (on average), the coefficient would
be insignificant or close to zero.
The results for the FD model including the potential benefits from income-shifting
are presented in Table 4. The first column shows the results without controls, and the
second column presents the estimates with the full set of controls using equation (13).
Columns 3 and 4 present the estimates without including the benefits.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES DWage DWage DWage DWage
DW∗ 0.662*** 0.663*** 0.620*** 0.620***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
4Uˆ 2,796.05*** 2,799.77***
(184.450) (184.449)
DOwnership -29.315 -32.053***
(20.786) (4.221)
DTurnover 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
DTotal assets 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
DProfits -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
DEmployees -9.875 -3.855
(8.424) (12.044)
DOther cap. income -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 6,115 6,115 6,115 6,115
F-test (1st stage) 1,627.28 407.96
R-squared 0.356 0.357 0.319 0.319
Note: Owner-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01. Estimated by OLS/2SLS using
the years 2002 and 2007: the dependent variable is the difference in realized gross wages.
Table 4: First-differences model with benefits from optimization
Monetary benefits have a significant effect on income-shifting behavior. The sign of
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the coefficient is positive as expected. The estimate implies that a 1% increase in benefits
from income-shifting increases the difference in realized gross wages by approximately
2,800 €. This effect is also related to the heterogeneity of the average estimate discussed
before. We estimate larger responses for those who faced large incentive changes due
to the tax reform. Those owners who faced clear changes in tax incentives usually also
benefit more in monetary terms from shifting income than those who faced only minor
changes.
The baseline income-shifting estimate increases slightly after adding the potential
benefits into the model, but the magnitude of the tax code effect is statistically the same
as without the benefits. After including the benefits to the model, none of the control
variables are significant. This indicates that the tax schedule and the simple costs from
applying it are the main factors behind owners’ decisions to withdraw different types of
income from the firm28.
Chetty and Saez (2010) conclude that concentrated ownership increases tax opti-
mization among corporate owners. Our results from the model including the benefits do
not support this view. When we explicitly include the potential benefits from income-
shifting into the model, we find the ownership share to be irrelevant in tax avoidance
behavior. Therefore, the ownership structure is not as important an aspect as the actual
costs. However, our data set includes only shareholders of private corporations who own
at least 50% of the firm alone or together with family members, and thus we cannot offer
a general result for the relationship between the ownership share and income-shifting.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we quantify the extent of income-shifting behavior by the main owners
of privately held corporations in Finland. In addition, we explore the heterogeneity of
the income-shifting response among different owners and firms, and study how the costs
and benefits associated with income-shifting affect tax avoidance behavior.
In many tax systems, entrepreneurs and business owners can minimize taxes by
choosing an optimal combination of different income types as their personal compen-
sation from the firm. In Finland, the corporate and dividend tax reform of 2005 sig-
28As a robustness check, we also divide the data using the information from the distribution of
potential benefits. We use a 3% limit in potential monetary benefits to divide the data set into two
parts. 3% potential benefits means that by optimizing the gross income composition correctly, the
owner could have increased his/her total net income by this percentage. This approach also shows
that the owners with higher potential benefits optimize more precisely. However, the estimate is not
statistically different from the main result in the FD model. Results for the splitted data are presented
in Appendix G.
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nificantly changed the income-shifting incentives for privately held corporate owners.
In the reform, the taxation of dividends tightened, which led to an increase in the in-
centives to pay wages as a form of personal compensation. In the light of behavioral
tax research, the reform had an appealing feature: the incentives to replace dividends
with wages varied among approximately similar corporate owners. This identification
condition together with extensive micro data, including information on both the owner
and firm-level, give us a unique setup to study income-shifting behavior.
We find strong evidence that owners are active in income-shifting. Our main result
shows that a one euro change in the tax-optimal gross wage results in a 66 cent change
in realized gross wages (on average). Our lower bound income-shifting estimate implies
a 32 cent change in realized gross wages. These estimates indicate that the effect of the
tax code on the composition of income is significant both statistically and economically.
In addition, the income-shifting response seems to be relatively homogeneous between
different firms and owners, as only the relative size of the tax incentive change affects
income-shifting activity. The results also suggest that the dividend distribution pattern
of Finnish privately held corporations is driven by tax considerations, and not, for
example, by the actual rate of return on invested capital or the ownership share of the
main owner. Similarly, executive wage compensation do not seem to reflect the actual
work contribution to the firm.
We show that tax avoidance via income-shifting has welfare consequences even in
the absence of real economy effects (labor supply, work effort, real investments etc.).
Using standard approaches in the excess burden literature, we approximate the average
marginal deadweight loss of income-shifting to be in the range of 0.12-0.21, depending
on the empirical strategy used. This suggests that limiting the scope of income-shifting
through administrative and legal measures has positive effects on general welfare. The
government can alleviate the disadvantageous effects of income-shifting by reducing the
difference between wage and dividend tax rates, and limiting the legal possibilities to
shift income between tax bases.
Furthermore, our results show that the costs and benefits from income-shifting are
important parts of tax avoidance behavior. Larger monetary benefits from changing
the income composition drive entrepreneurs to increase income-shifting. Therefore, the
inefficiency caused by income-shifting can also be influenced by affecting the costs of tax
minimization. At least to some extent, the costs can be affected by simply adjusting the
tax regulations.
However, the costs associated with income-shifting do not seem to hamper tax avoid-
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ance as a whole. Income shifting is very active, even though the overall tax minimization
routine associated with the Finnish tax system is relatively complex. All in all, our study
suggests that the deadweight loss caused by income-shifting should not be unheeded,
and the incentives for income-shifting should be carefully examined by policy makers
when a corporate tax system is re-designed.
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Appendix A
Dividend taxation in Finland and the dividend and corporate tax
reform of 2005
1993-2004 2005 -a
Imputation system
Full imputation of
corporate taxes, single
taxation of dividends
Partial tax relief from
double taxation of
dividends
Capital income tax
rate (nominal) 29%
b 28%
Imputed rate of return
on net assets (% of net
assets, effective)
9.585% 9%
Dividend tax rate,
including corporate
taxes (effective):
• Dividends from
listed corporations 29% 40.5% (2005: 37.8%)
• Dividends from
privately held
corporations:
– dividends below the
imputed return on net
assets
29%
Below 90,000 €: 26%.
Over 90,000 €: 40.5%
(2005: 26% / 37.8%)
– dividends above the
imputed return on net
assets
Earned income
taxation (with some
differences compared
to labor income
taxationc)
26% + partial earned
income taxation: 70%
under earned income
taxation (2005: 57%),
30% tax free (2005:
43%)
Corporate tax rate 29%d 26%
aIn 2005, special transition rules were applied in dividend taxation. The effective tax rates for 2005
are given in parentheses.
bNominal tax rate on capital income in 2000–2004. In 1993–1996, the tax rate was 25%, and in
1996–2000 28%.
cThe earned income tax allowance in municipal taxation was not granted for dividend income.
Dividends are not subject to wage-based social security contributions.
dNominal corporate tax rate in 2000–2004. In 1993–1996, the corporate tax rate was 25%, and in
1996–2000 28%.
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Other notable features of the Finnish tax code and regulations
Firm-level social security contributions
Firm-level social security contributions are paid on wage income only. The level of the
contribution is 2-6% of wages depending on the level of total wages paid and the depre-
ciations made by the firm.
Tax deductions for wages and earned income dividends
There are some differences in tax deductions and tax allowances between wages and
earned income dividends, especially before the 2005 tax reform. Most importantly, the
earned income tax allowance in municipal income taxation was only granted to wage
income before the reform. After the reform, the earned income tax allowance was also
granted based on earned income dividends. All the differences in tax allowances and
deductions are accounted for in the analysis.
YEL entrepreneur status (entrepreneurial pension insurance)
Our analysis is limited to owners who own at least 50% of the firm (alone or together
with immediate family members), and hold an executive position in the firm. Owners
who satisfy these conditions are given a favorable treatment in pension insurance contri-
butions, and these owners are termed YEL entrepreneurs in the Finnish tax legislation.
An owner satisfying the YEL conditions cannot change his/her status to another form
of entrepreneurial insurance. The main principles of pension insurance payments for
YEL entrepreneurs are briefly discussed below.
Mandatory pension insurance payments (YEL payments)
Pension insurance payments are not included in our analysis. Among YEL entrepreneurs,
mandatory pension insurance payments are not levied on dividend income either before
or after the reform. The pension insurance payments are not dependent on the actual
wages paid either. YEL-insured entrepreneurs report a self-selected computational level
of wages from which pension insurance payments are accumulated from. The reported
wages for pension insurance payments can be above or below the actual wages paid
without implications or sanctions. However, there are regulations for both the lower
and upper limits of these reported wages, which are, however, also independent of ac-
tual taxable wage income. Therefore, the mandatory pension insurance payments have
no effect on the actual income division between wages and dividends, and are thus ex-
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cluded from our analysis.
Limitations on paying dividends or wages
A corporation cannot distribute dividends more than it holds distributable assets. These
include, for example, accumulated profits and non-tied equity. With some firms this
might limit the scope for income-shifting. Wages cannot be paid when there is no work
contribution to the firm. Otherwise wages may be regarded as a veiled distribution
of profits. However, this is a minor issue in our analysis since our sample of corpo-
rate owners hold an executive position in the firm, and are thus by default assumed
by the tax authorities to work for the firm (by the legal definition of the YEL-insured
entrepreneurs).
Changes in the tax code between 2002-2003 and 2007-2008
In our analysis, we also include year differences outside the tax reform of 2005. In
general, there have been only trivial changes in the income tax code outside the 2005
reform. The main tax rate changes between 2002-2003 and 2007-2008 are small declines
(0.5 percentage points) in progressive earned income tax rates throughout the income
distribution, and a small average increase in proportional municipal level earned income
tax rates (0.26 and 0.09 percentage points in 2002-2003 and 2007-2008, respectively).
All these changes in the earned income tax code are accounted for in our analysis.
There were no relevant reforms in dividend or corporate taxation between 2002-2003
and 2007-2008.
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Appendix B
Illustrative example: Optimal gross income combination (W ∗, D∗)
before and after the 2005 tax reform
Table 5 presents the tax optimal gross wage levels for a representative owner of a
privately held corporation before and after the 2005 tax reform. The optimal gross wage
levels in Table 5 are defined assuming that the owner owns 100% of the shares and that
the owner has no earned income from other sources29.
Total
gross
income
Net
assets
Tax optimal
gross wage
2002
Tax optimal
gross wage
2003
Tax optimal
gross wage
2007
Tax optimal
gross wage
2008
15,000 10,000 7,700 7,300 14,500 14,100
50,000 10,000 7,700 7,300 49,100 49,100
100,000 10,000 7,700 7,300 67,500 66,000
15,000 100,000 12,000 12,200 14,500 14,000
50,000 100,000 7,700 7,300 41,000 41,000
100,000 100,000 7,700 7,300 67,500 66,000
15,000 500,000 12,000 12,200 14,500 14,000
50,000 500,000 12,000 12,200 14,500 14,000
100,000 500,000 7,700 7,300 55,000 55,000
Table 5: Tax-optimal gross wages before (2002, 2003) and after (2007, 2008) the 2005 tax
reform with different levels of total gross income and net assets of the firm (in nominal
euros)
In general, earned income from other sources lowers the tax optimal gross wage,
especially before the reform. For example, assume the owner has 2,500 € of other
earned income with total gross income from the firm being 50,000 € and net assets
100,000 €. The tax optimal gross wage in 2003 is in this case 4,800 € (compared with
7,300 € without other earned income). However, with the same combination of total
gross income, net assets and other earned income, the optimal gross wage does not
change after the reform (41,000 € in both 2007 and 2008). This is due to the fact that
after 2005 the taxation of earned income dividends increased sharply. After the reform,
it is not in general optimal for the owner to replace wages with dividends after receiving
a modest amount of other earned income.
29The tax optimal gross dividend is simply the difference between total gross income and tax optimal
gross wages.
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Appendix C
Year Stat Wages
Optimal
wages Dividends
Optimal
dividends
Total
income
Ownership
share
2002 Mean 19,806 5,317 27,105 41,594 46,911 0.82
SD 16,986 3,499 82,510 84,965 85,066 0.23
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2003 Mean 19,244 4,794 32,744 47,194 51,988 0.84
SD 17,318 3,401 142,723 144,477 144,533 0.23
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2007 Mean 23,083 26,033 32,767 29,817 55,850 0.82
SD 22,443 19,416 99,552 100,123 102,931 0.22
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2008 Mean 23,980 26,233 35,487 33,234 59,468 0.82
SD 24,064 20,041 103,706 105,115 107,824 0.22
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
Table 6: Descriptive statistics (2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008): Main owners
Year Stat Turnover Employees Total
assets
Net assets
2002 Mean 78,2450 10.35 400,805 285,155
SD 4,092,140 32.98 2,174,166 1,669,665
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2003 Mean 946,741 10.27 529,807 381,950
SD 3,982,281 30.64 2,375,763 5,233,616
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2007 Mean 1,082,630 10.60 723,319 448,007
SD 3,155,168 36.14 2,985,295 2,378,661
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
2008 Mean 1,152,018 10.63 811,968 516,807
SD 3,329,805 36.25 3,452,935 2,791,899
N 6,277 6,277 6,277 6,277
Table 7: Descriptive statistics (2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008): Firms
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Appendix D
(2002) (2003) (2007) (2008)
VARIABLES Wage Wage Wage Wage
W∗ 1.050*** 1.054*** 0.904*** 0.919***
(0.075) (0.071) (0.014) (0.015)
age 731.402*** 796.057*** 152.225 13.974
(178.766) (177.301) (166.080) (180.098)
age sq. -8.102*** -9.032*** -1.295 0.104
(1.912) (1.852) (1.650) (1.771)
male 2,054.167*** 1,887.503*** 222.468 103.157
(632.076) (610.805) (471.941) (500.517)
ownership -5,615.921*** -6,330.395*** -3,311.677*** -1,888.356**
(1,003.374) (975.413) (773.002) (881.820)
turnover 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
total assets -0.000 0.001** 0.000* 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
profits 0.009*** -0.000 -0.001* -0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
employees 18.056 28.357 5.856 3.568
(23.840) (25.448) (5.471) (7.255)
capital income -0.001*** -0.011 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.009) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant -5,060.437 8,823.021** 2,042.214 806.022
(4,528.741) (4,394.755) (4,210.924) (4,548.095)
Observations 5,160 5,611 6,244 6,237
R-squared 0.115 0.114 0.637 0.613
Note: Owner-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 8: Cross-section results for the years 2002, 2003, 2007 and 2008 by OLS
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Appendix E
(1) (2)
VARIABLES ΔW ΔW
ΔW ∗ 0.681*** 0.680***
(0.012) (0.016)
ΔOwnership -9.120
(52.054)
ΔTurnover 0.000
(0.000)
ΔTotal assets 0.000
(0.000)
ΔProfits -0.001
(0.002)
ΔEmployees -7.535
(12.391)
ΔOther capital income -0.000
(0.000)
Observations 5,613 5,613
R-squared 0.348 0.349
Note: Owner-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01.
Table 9: Results for the first-differences model for the years 2002 and 2008 by OLS
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Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Employees Employees
0-25th p 26-50th p 51-75th p 76-100th p 0-25th p 26-50th p
VARIABLES DW DW DW DW DW DW
4W∗ 0.676*** 0.597*** 0.646*** 0.613*** 0.604*** 0.626***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.033) (0.025) (0.034)
Observations 1,528 1,529 1,529 1,529 2,009 1,387
R-squared 0.383 0.345 0.365 0.253 0.317 0.332
Employees Employees Total assets Total assets Total assets Total assets
51-75th p 76-100th p 0-25th p 26-50th p 51-75th p 76-100th p
VARIABLES DW DW DW DW DW DW
4W∗ 0.606*** 0.655*** 0.738*** 0.711*** 0.640*** 0.647***
(0.027) (0.033) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033)
Observations 1,301 1,418 1,529 1,529 1,529 1,528
R-squared 0.377 0.302 0.359 0.417 0.380 0.262
Age Age Age Age Male Female
0-25th p 26-50th p 51-75th p 76-100th p
VARIABLES DW DW DW DW DW DW
4W∗ 0.601*** 0.628*** 0.606*** 0.583*** 0.623*** 0.590***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.037) (0.017) (0.033)
Observations 1,597 1,587 1,623 1,308 5,247 868
R-squared 0.330 0.348 0.283 0.274 0.318 0.355
Agriculture Mining Industry Construction Commerce Hotels
VARIABLES DW DW DW DW DW DW
4W∗ 0.836*** 0.561*** 0.692*** 0.570*** 0.600*** 0.638***
(0.108) (0.081) (0.048) (0.035) (0.030) (0.092)
Observations 70 156 842 1,070 1,500 137
R-squared 0.537 0.394 0.335 0.308 0.322 0.430
Logistics Finance Estate Education Health care Other
services
VARIABLES DW DW DW DW DW DW
4W∗ 0.563*** 0.964*** 0.636*** 0.693*** 0.658*** 0.579***
(0.078) (0.107) (0.028) (0.124) (0.068) (0.108)
Observations 462 63 1,433 48 208 125
R-squared 0.254 0.660 0.342 0.590 0.423 0.346
Note: Owner-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01.
Table 10: Results for the first-differences model by OLS for different subgroups
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(1) (2)
VARIABLES ΔW ΔW
ΔW ∗ 0.641*** 0.716***
(0.016) (0.056)
ΔOwnership -31.844*** 1,732.515
(3.868) (1,176.120)
ΔTurnover 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
ΔTotal assets 0.000 -0.003
(0.000) (0.003)
ΔProfits -0.000 -0.006
(0.000) (0.013)
ΔEmployees 1.853 -3.822
(16.713) (20.977)
ΔOther capital income -0.001 -0.008
(0.000) (0.006)
Observations 5,489 626
R-squared 0.341 0.417
Note: Owner-level clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01.
Table 11: First-differences model for the years 2002 and 2007 estimated by OLS. Data
divided by relative benefits from correct tax optimization, Column (1) < 3%, Column
(2) >3%
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